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Abstract
This paper proposes a framework for merging inconsis-
tent beliefs in the analysis of security protocols. The merge
application is a procedure of computing the inferred beliefs
of message sources and resolving the conflicts among the
sources. Some security properties of secure messages are
used to ensure the correctness of authentication of mes-
sages. Several instances are presented, and demonstrate
our method is useful in resolving inconsistent beliefs in se-
cure messages.
1 Introduction
To succeed in e-commerce marketplace, Security proto-
cols have played an important role in authenticating secure
messages and achieving security. Recently, formal methods
have been prevalent to aid the design and analysis of the
security protocols [1, 2]. In [3], they are either used to eval-
uate the trust that can be put on the goal by the legitimate
communicants using the beliefs of the principals [2], or ana-
lyze the security of a protocol by examining the knowledge
gained by an intruder in the course of the protocols. In gen-
eral, they ideally assume that the communication channel
and principals are secure and trustworthy.
However, in a hostile environment, the beliefs of prin-
cipals and transmitted messages can no longer be justified.
Then, it is necessary to have the capability of modelling the
imperfect working conditions and verifying protocol under
such circumstances. In recent years, the uncertainty and
partial belief have attracted much attentions [3]. Fagin and
Halpern [4] introduced a new probabilistic method to deal
with uncertainty. Campbell [3] presented an extension of
BAN logic to reason about a secure protocol by qualify-
ing the beliefs of principals with probability. Moreover,
many formalisms have been put forward in the artificial
intelligence and database literature to merge the inconsis-
tent knowledge. In [5], Liberatore gave a merging process
arbitration to merge the different views between different
sources of information; Lin defined a merging operator by
majority in contrast with arbitration to merge knowledge
base in [6]. All these methods are useful in dealing with
the inconsistent beliefs.
Unlike the general knowledge, the belief of secure mes-
sages has some properties, such as the freshness and dy-
namics. We have to guarantee the beliefs are not expired
before starting validation. Besides, the inferred belief of
every message source is actually obtained by combing the
assumed belief, observed belief and probability of belief of
rules together.
This paper proposes a formal framework to merge incon-
sistent beliefs in secure messages by a majority criterion.
It minimizes the global dissatisfaction rather than individ-
ual dissatisfaction. Moreover, the freshness and dynamics
properties of secure messages are considered when integrat-
ing their beliefs, which aim at ensuring the correctness of
verification of security protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we present some technical preliminaries. Section 3
describes how to merge the inconsistent belief. Some ex-




Suppose L denotes a set of proposition formulae formed
in the usual way from a set of atom symbols A. In particu-
lar, A can contain α and ¬α for some atom α. The logical
operators ∧, ∨, ¬ and → denotes the connectives. We use
variables X, Y, P and CA for principals, Greek letters α,
γ, θ, µ, β, ϕ, φ and ψ ∈ A for formulae, m for messages,
Texpiration for expiration date of message, T for timestamp.
Let ∃ be existential quantifier. Let≡ be logical equivalence.
A model of a formula φ is a possible set of atoms where φ is
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true in the usual sense;  is the weight of message sources;
Let k be a key.
• <- , -> :: Message1 × Message2 ⇒ Message, which
denotes a set of messages.
• - sends - , - :: Principal1 × Principal2 × Message ⇒
Formula, which denotes the message was transmitted
from Principal1 to Principal2.
• knows :: Principal × Message ⇒ Formula, which de-
notes the message has been generated.
• sees :: Principal × Message ⇒ Formula, which de-
notes the message has been received.
• fresh :: Message ⇒ Formula, which denotes the mes-
sage has not been uttered.
• - believes - , - :: Principal1 × Principal2 ×Message⇒
Formula, which denotes Principal1 believes the mes-
sages are fresh and were sent from Principal2.
• - authenticates -, - :: Principal1 × Principal2 × Mes-
sages ⇒ Formula, which denotes Principal1’s belief
that the message sent by Principal2 is authentic.
Example 2.1 Suppose m, m1 and m2 are messages and P1
and P2 are principals. <m1, m2> denotes the conjunction
messages; “P1 sends P2, m” denotes the message m was
sent from P1 to P2; “P1 knows m” denotes m has been gen-
erated by P1; “P2 sees m” presents principal P2 has re-
ceived message m; “fresh m” presents m is fresh and not a
replay of previous message; “P2 believes P1, m” denotes
the message m is fresh and really from P1; “Principal1
authenticates Principal2, m” presents Principal1 believes
message m is reliable.
In general, facts are stated in the form of expressions
called sentences. We define an atomic sentence is formed
from an n-ary relation operator mentioned above and n atom
symbols a1, a2, . . ., an, by combining them as follows.
r (a1, a2, . . ., an)
Example 2.2 “know(Alice, <m1, . . ., mn>)”, “send(Alice,
Bob, <m1, . . ., mn>)” and “fresh(m)” are three atomic sen-
tences.
The entailment relationship among the above operators
is listed below.
(1)  knows(P, m) → sends(P, Q, m)
(2)  sends(P, Q, m) → sees(Q, m)
where we can conclude ( knows(P, m) → sends(P, Q, m))
∧ ( sends(P, Q, m) → sees(Q, m)) ⇒ sees(Q, m).
In ENDL logic [7], sends, knows, sees and fresh are
primitive operators. We can turn these operators into the
following axiom.
 knows(P, m) × sends(P, Q, m)× fresh(m) ×
sees(Q, m) ⇒ believes(Q, P, m)
where the principal P generates m and then sends it to Q.
If Q receives this message and confirms it is fresh, it is rea-
sonable for Q to believe m sent from P. However, it does
not imply Q believes the integrity and confidentiality of m.
The validation processes are listed below. The knows, sends
and sees operators present the dynamics properties of secure
messages.
Moreover, the implication α⇒ β actually denotes a rule.
The following rules are derived from the authentication ax-
ioms of ENDL.
(1)  knows(X, m) × knows(X, S(<IDY , T, H(m)>,
Spv(Y))) × knows(X, Spb(Y)) ⇒ authenticates(X, Y,
m)
(2)  knows(X, m)× authenticates(X, Y, H(m))⇒ authen-
ticates(X, Y, m)
(3)  knows(X, Spb(Y))× knows(X, S(<IDY , T, Spb(Y)>,
Spv(CA))) × knows(X, Spb(CA)) ⇒ authenticates(X,
Y, Spb(Y))
where ID is identity; H(m) is the hashing of message m;
Spv() and Spb() present private and public signature key re-
spectively; and S(m, k) describes m is encrypted by k.
Usually, the believes operator should be appropriate for
describing belief. However, the belief in secure messages
is more complicated. It not only depends on the assumed
belief and observed belief, but also on the belief of inference
rules. We will give the details in next section.
Definition 2.1 Let T be a timestamp attached to message
m. If |Clock−T| < ∆t1 + ∆t2 regarding received messages
or T < Texpiration regarding generated messages then m is
fresh; otherwise m is viewed as a replay.
where Clock is the local time, 	t1 is an interval represent-
ing the normal discrepancy between the server’s clock and
the local clock, and 	t2 is an interval representing the ex-
pected network delay time [8]. The timestamp plays an im-
portant role in preventing the replays of previously trans-
mitted secure messages.
Example 2.3 Suppose Clock is 8 Oct 2004 15:53:11
+0200. The timestamp attached to a received message m
is
8 Oct 2004 15:53:10 +0200
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indicates that the creator’s local time is 15:53:10, that the
creator’s time zone is +0200 (two hours east of UTC), and
that the actual time is 8 Oct 2004 13:53:10 in UTC. Let ∆t2
= 0.04. Let server’s clock be 8 Oct 2004 15:53:12 +0200,
then ∆t1 = |12 − 11| = 1. Thus, the message m is fresh
since |Clock−T| = |10 − 11| = 1 < ∆t1 + ∆t2 = 1 + 0.04
= 1.04.
We can classify the message sources into three categories
by using MS , MR and MT = {MT1 , . . ., MTn}, in which
MS , MR and MT present the message sources of sender,
receiver and the third party respectively. Ideally, it assumes
that these message sources have equal weight in the same
messages.
Definition 2.2 Let |=support be a supporting relationship.
For a secure message source M, M |=support is defined as




MS |=support α iff “knows(MS , α)” ∧ “fresh(α)”
MR |=support α iff “believes(MR, MS , α)” ∧ “fresh(α)”
MT |=support α iff “believes(MT , MS , α)” ∧ “fresh(α)”
where the receiver and the third party can receive messages
from different senders. In particular, “α is fresh” in these
formulae is decided by using T < Texpiration. Also, the MR
and MT must check the freshness of α by using |Clock−T|
< ∆t1 + ∆t2 when they receive messages from the senders.
These will assist them in determining whether they believe
the message α or not.
The supporting relation considers the dynamics property
of secure message by using the knows and sees operators
that describe the dynamic transmission of secure messages.
Furthermore, the freshness of secure message is protected
by relying on the discriminant of timestamp.
Definition 2.3 Let |=match be a matching relationship. M
|=match is defined as follows, where Rule = {rule1, rule2,
rule3} is a set of axioms used to authenticate messages, and
SM is a subset of message source M.


MR |=match r iff “∃ SMR ⊆ MR, ∃ r ∈ Rule” and
“SMR matches r”
MT |=match r iff “∃ SMT ⊆ MT , ∃ r ∈ Rule” and
“SMT matches r”
where the principal searches the associated message source
M. If there is a subset derived from the message source M
that matches one of the three inference rules, we can decide
it is true; otherwise it is false. The message source MS is the
initiator of messages. Therefore we just verify the message
m in terms of the supporting relation but do not intend to
match the inference rules.
Definition 2.4 Let |=authenticate be a belief relationship.
M |=authenticate m is defined as follows, where m is a mes-
sage needed to be verified.


MS |=authenticate m iff “MS |=support m”
MR |=authenticate m iff “MR |=support m” and
∃r ∈ Rule, MR |=match r”
MT |=authenticate m iff “MT |=support m” and
“∃r ∈ Rule, MT |=match r”
where the supporting relation is the starting point. If one of
the rules is satisfied we can say the message m is reliable;
otherwise it is unreliable.
The |=support, |=match and |=authenticate actually de-
scribe the transformation of belief during the authentication
process of messages.
As mentioned above, the rule presents an entailment re-
lationship among messages. In particular, the conditions of
a rule can be the conclusion of other rule, called relevant
rule.
Definition 2.5 Suppose α1, . . ., αn (n ≥ 1) are secure
messages. Let α1 → α2, α2 → α3, . . ., αn−1 → αn be
entailment relationships among them. Then we can deduce
a new rule below if they are true.
α1 → α2 ∧ α2 → α3 ∧ . . . ∧ αn−1 → αn ⇒ α1 → αn
These entailment relationships virtually denote the oper-
ations of encryption, decryption, signature and authentica-
tion in cryptography.
Example 2.4 1) If Alice knows a symmetric key k and mes-
sage m then she knows e(m, k) that presents the message m
was encrypted by k; and 2) if Alice knows message m en-
crypted by k, then she can send encrypted m to Tom. A new
rule can then be derived from them, If Alice knows k and m,
then she can send the encrypted m to Tom for the reason that
the result of the first message is actually the condition of the
second message. As a result, Alice is able to send e(m, k) to
Tom.
Definition 2.6 Suppose β1, . . ., βn (n ≥ 1) are secure mes-
sages. M ∈ {MS , MR, MT }. Let β1 ∧, . . ., ∧ βn be a
conjunction, which is a set of secure messages connected
by the ∧ operator.
M |=support β1 ∧ . . . ∧ M |=support βn iff M |=support β1
∧, . . ., ∧ βn
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where if the message source M supports every message βi,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, then M should support the conjunction of these
messages and vice versa.
Besides, a supporting relation should satisfy these con-
straints. Let δ be a conjunction of atoms, and α and β be
atoms in the usual sense. The implication, transitivity and
negation are listed below.
1) Implication constraint: If M |=support δ → α and M
|=support δ, then M |=support α.
2) Transitivity constraint: If M |=support δ → αi and M
|=support α1 ∧ . . . ∧ αn → β, then M |=support α1 ∧
. . . ∧ αi−1 ∧ δ ∧ αi+1 ∧ . . . ∧ αn → β.
3) Negation constraint: If M |=support δ → ¬β, then M
|=support ¬(δ → β).
Consider the sensitivity of secure messages, it is hence
impractical for a secure message source to support the
disjunction messages with ‘or’ relationship, such as M
|=support α ∨ β.
2.2 Formal logic, Probability and Belief
A formal logic used to verify security protocols consists
of a set of sentences S and inference rules R. For example,
“knows (Alice, k) and sends(Alice, Bob, m) are sentences.
The sentences are formed in terms of the syntax of the logic.
It generates meaningful statements according to its seman-
tics. An inference rule indicates the relationship between
sentences. We will use a1, a2, . . ., an ⇒ c for the rule
which combines the sentence c with sentences a1, a2, . . .,
an. Among them, c is said to be the conclusion inferred
from the sentences a1, a2, . . ., an.
A sentence φ can be true or false. We can imagine two
set of possible worlds W1 and W2. W1 contains worlds
in which φ was true and W2 contains worlds where φ is
false. The actual world, however, must be in one of these
two sets, but we might not know which one. We can model
the uncertainty by probability.
Define the probability space (W , F , P) for B = S ∪ R,
such that for each w ∈W , we can assign a truth assignment
to c by defining w(c) = 1 if there is a proof of c from B.
The probability P describes the degree of belief of the
conclusions. The probability of a conclusion c can be de-
fined as the probability that the proof of c from B is valid.
Let M = {M1, . . ., Mn} be a sequence of message
sources. It is natural that the sentences are assigned differ-
ent belief by them. In general, the belief of m depends on
the assumed belief (weight), inferred belief and the proba-
bility of belief of rules. According to the definition of prob-
ability of independent events, the belief in a conclusion c
inferred from Mi can be defined as follows:
Bel(Mi, c) = i ∗ reliability(Mi, c) ∗ P(Rule)
3 Merging Inconsistent Beliefs in Secure
Messages
3.1 Belief in Secure Messages
Belief is referred as principals view of secure messages,
which can be introduced directly or inferred through per-
ception, assumption or communication among principals.
Among them, the observed and assumed belief are self-
supported belief. The former is the practical belief observed
by the message source, and the latter presents the assumed
weight attached with each message source. In addition, we
have to include the probability of belief of rules.
The weight  of a message source is an assumed belief
and recommended by authorities. Its value may vary be-
tween 0 and 1. MS , MR and MT represent the weights
of sender, receiver and the third party respectively. For ex-
ample, MS = 0.5 means the possibility of the sender’s be-
lief is 50% only.
Unlike the weight, the practical belief is derived from the
observation by checking the inconsistency of secure mes-
sages.
Definition 3.1 The support function from A to [0, 1] is de-
fined below when α is not empty, and |M |=support ∅| =
0.
|M |=support α| = |α||α ∪ ¬α| × 100
where |M|=support α| is the total number of α supported
by the model of M and |α| is the number of occurrence
of the set of α in the model of M. If |M |=support α|
= 0, then we can say M has no opinion upon α and vice
versa; if |M |=support α| = 1, it indicates that there is
not inconsistent message ¬α in the message source M; if
|M |=support α| = c, 0<c<1, it presents α is partially sup-
ported by M.
Then, the reliability between α and a set of message
sources is defined below.
Definition 3.2 The set {MS , MR, MT } is defined as the
sum of supports between α and each Mi, i ∈{S, R, T}, and
|MS unionsqMR unionsqMT |=support ∅| = 0.
reliability(M,α) = |MS unionsqMR unionsqMT |=support α|
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where the unionsq denotes a union operation but the repeated
items are reserved, such as {α, ¬β} unionsq {α} = {α, α, ¬β}.
Moreover, α and β have to be fresh in each source of secure
messages in terms of the above definitions. In particular, if
|MS unionsqMR unionsqMT |=support α| = 0 then reliability(α) = 0,
which presents the set of sources of secure messages does
not support α.
The reliability is the observed belief, which is shared
among the message sources. Except that, the weights of
message sources and the probability of belief of rules need
to be included to measure the final belief of authenticated
goal.
3.2 Merging Inconsistent Belief
The inconsistent belief happens frequently in hostile en-
vironment. In the verification of security protocols, one of
the most important steps is to check the authenticity of se-
cure messages.
In our formal framework, the ultimate goal is to derive
the reliability of statement “X authenticates Y, m”, in which
m can be encryption key, digital signature etc. In Definition
4, we have described the satisfiable conditions regarding the
authentication of secure messages. The belief of a statement
m can be defined as follows.


belMS |=authenticate m = MS ∗ reliability(M, m)
belMR|=authenticate m = MR ∗ reliability(M, m) ∗
PMR rule(m)
belMT |=authenticate m = MT ∗ reliability(M, m) ∗
PMT rule(m)
where the probability of belief of MS can be derived from
the assigned weight and calculated reliability on message.
However, the probabilities of belief of MR and MT have to
depend on the probability of the matched rules except their
weights and reliability on messages.
The message source should not only maintain individual
beliefs but also is responsible for keeping a common belief
shared among them. The uncertain belief is not allowed
here under the consideration of security. Therefore, the final
updated beliefs shared among MS , MR and MT are:
{
if belMi|=authenticatem ≥ 0.5, Mi believes statement m;
otherwise, Mi disbelieves statement m
Suppose Sum(M, Bel) is the number of message sources
that believes m, and Sum(M, Dis) is the number of them
that disbelieves m. Finally, we can conclude the following
formulaes.
• If Sum(M, Bel) > Sum(M, Dis), then the authenticator
decides to believe in the statement m;
• otherwise, the authenticator disbelieves m.
Thereby, the problem of inconsistent belief is solved us-
ing the majority criterion.
4 Examples of Merging Inconsistent Belief
Let S be the sender, R be the receiver, T be the third party
and A be the authenticator in the following examples. For
brevity, it assumes that all the messages transmitted among
the secure message sources are fresh. Also, the messages
are assumed to be generated and sent by the sender and re-
ceived and seen by whom it claims to be.
Example 4.1 Suppose MS = {α, β, φ, θ, α ∧ β ∧ θ → γ},
MR = {¬α, φ, ¬γ, φ ∧ ¬γ → ¬θ}, and MT = {α, β, φ,
θ, γ}. Among them, α ≡ ‘message m’, β ≡ ‘the sender’s
private signature key Spv(S)’, φ ≡ ‘the sender’s public sig-
nature key Spb(S)’, θ ≡ ‘the sender’s identity IDS’ and γ ≡
‘the sender’s digital signature S(<IDS , T, H(m)>, Spv(S))’.
Let MS = MR = 0.8 but MT = 0.7. Inference rule: A
knows α × A knows β × A knows γ ⇒ A authenticates α
is the rule used to authenticate α. Let PMR rule(α) = 0.8,
PMT rule(α) = 0.9.
Then model(MS) ≡ model(MT ) ≡ {α, β, θ, φ, γ} and
model(MR) ≡ {¬α, φ, ¬θ, ¬γ}, and reliability(M, α) = (1
+ 1) / 3 = 0.67. α is the authenticated goal here.
In the message set of MS , α ∧ β ∧ θ is supported by MS
for MS supports α, β and θ. The result gives the common
belief in α shared among the messgae sources MS , MR and
MT .
Finally, the inferred belief can be derived from the as-
sumed belief, observed belief and the probability of belief
of the rule.
1. belMS |=authenticate α = MS ∗ reliability(M, α) = 0.8
* 0.67 = 0.54
2. belMR|=authenticate α = MR ∗ reliability(M, α) *
PMR Rule= 0.8 * 0.67 * 0.8 = 0.43
3. belMT |=authenticate α = MT ∗ reliability(M, α) *
PMT Rule= 0.7 * 0.67 * 0.9 = 0.42
Accordingly, we can get Sum(M, Bel) = 1 and Sum(M,
Dis) = 2. Finally, the authenticator decides to disbelieve α
for Sum(M, Bel) < Sum(M, Dis).
Example 4.2 Suppose MS = {α, α→ β}, MR = {¬α, ¬α
→ ¬β} and MT = {α, β}. Among them, α ≡ ‘a message
m’ and β ≡ ‘H(m)’, namely the hashing of message m. Let
MS = MR = 0.9 but MT = 1.0. The rule, A knows α
× A authenticates sender, β → A authenticates sender, α, is
used to validate the authenticity of α.
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Then model(MS) ≡ model(MT ) ≡ {α, β} and
model(MR) ≡ {¬α, ¬β}, and reliability(M, α) = (1 + 1)
/ 3 = 0.67.
Let PMR rule(α) = PMT rule(α) = 0.9. The inferred
belief is then given, belMS |=authenticate α = 0.9 * 0.67 =
0.60, belMR|=authenticate α = 0.9 * 0.67 * 0.9 = 0.54, and
belMT |=authenticate α = 1.0 * 0.67 * 0.9 = 0.60.
Finally, Sum(M, Bel) = 3 and Sum(M, Dis) = 0. Hence,
the authenticator decides to believe α for Sum(M, Bel) >
Sum(M, Dis).
5 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a probabilistic method to eval-
uate the inconsistent beliefs in secure messages. It makes
us able to compute their individual beliefs in secure mes-
sages, and resolve the conflict among them by majority cri-
terion. The examples have proved that our method is useful
in integrating inconsistent belief in the analysis of security
protocols.
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